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Case No. 20090471-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
State of Utah,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.

Timothy Lamoreaux,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from a conviction for distribution or arranging to
distribute a controlled substance in a drug-free zone. This Court has jurisdiction
under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) (West 2008).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Whether the trial court erred in admitting the officer's testimony where the
record shows it was of his independent recollection of Defendant's admission to
arranging to distribute methamphetamine and not hearsay?
Standard of Review. "The determination of whether evidence constitutes
hearsay is a question of law that we review for correctness." Prosper, Inc. v.
Department of Workforce Services, 2007 UT App 281, |8,168 P.3d 344 (citing State v.
Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 335 (Utah 1993)).

RULES
The following rules are attached at Addendum A:
Rules 612,801,802;
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 30.
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE,

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with one count of distribution of or arranging to
distribute a controlled substance in a drug-free zone, a first degree felony, in
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §58-37-8(1)(a)(ii)(2004). R091. A jury convicted
Defendant. R129; 193:55. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a statutory five-tolife term in the Utah State Prison with a recommendation that he serve the least
amount of time possible under the law. R176. Defendant timely appealed. R182.
The Utah Supreme Court transferred the case to this Court. R186.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Testimony of Officer Shane Sorensen
On the evening of July 1,2008, just before 10:00 p.m., Provo City Police Officer
Shane Sorensen responded to a call from an apartment complex owner. Rl92:60,62,
67. The caller reported that a car was illegally parked across the street and there was
"other activity/' Id. at 62-63. Officer Sorensen could not locate the reported vehicle,
but in crossing the street, he came upon a gray car occupied by three adults and a
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one to two-year-old child. Id. at 63-64,66. Suzanne Ruesch was later identified as
the owner and driver and Amber Coutts as one of the adult passengers. Id. at 65-66.
The officer also observed one man at the passenger side of the car and Defendant at
the driver's side. Id. at 64-65. As he approached, Officer Sorensen saw Defendant
hand Ms. Ruesch something. Id. at 67. Concerned for his safety, the officer directed
both men to the rear of the car, where he could keep an eye on them. Id. at 67-68.
He spoke with Ms. Ruesch, who admitted that there was methamphetamine in the
car, placed there by Defendant. Id. at 69-70. Based on this statement and Ms.
Ruesch's consent, Officer Sorensen searched the car. Id. at 70, 126. Behind the
passenger's seat, he found a black bag. Id. at 70. Within the bag, there were "a lot"
of small baggies, a cigarette container containing three baggies of what he believed
to be "a large amount of methamphetamine," and other paraphernalia, including a
digital scale. Id. at 70-72, 76. A Utah State Crime Lab chemist later confirmed the
substance to be methamphetamine, which weighed, in total, 16.2 grams. Rl92:96-97.
Based on the large amount of methamphetamine in the three baggies, the
paraphernalia, and Defendant's having handed something to Ms. Ruesch, Officer
Sorensen

initially

suspected

that

only

Defendant

was

distributing

methamphetamine. Id. at 71-72, 75f 77. Accordingly, Officer Sorensen arrested
Defendant and gave him Miranda warnings. Id. at 68,78. Defendant initially denied
3

any involvement with the methamphetamine.

Id. at 78.

The officer then

interviewed Ms. Ruesch and, based on that exchange, also arrested her and Ms.
Courts. Id. at 77-78.
Officer Sorensen transported Defendant, Ms. Ruesch, and Ms. Coutts to the
Utah County Jail. Id. at 78-79. There, after again denying his involvement,
"eventually [Defendant] did make some incriminating statements/' Id. at 79-80.
When asked to describe what Defendant said, Officer Sorensen began by saying,
"according to my report/' but then asked, for the first time, if he could refer to his
report. Id. at 80. In response, the prosecutor cautioned the officer, "You can refer to
it to refresh your memory, but please don't read from it." Id. at 81. Officer Sorensen
then testified, "Okay.

He did admit that he was involved in making the

arrangements to distribute methamphetamine," although the officer acknowledged
that Defendant "probably did not use those specific words." Id. When again asked
if he recalled "roughly" what Defendant had said, Officer Sorensen answered, "To to be honest, to the best of my recollection, I - I can't recall his specific words,
exactly what he said." Id. When then asked how Defendant indicated he had been
involved, Officer Sorensen stated, "He - eventually said, 'Yeah, you know, I - you're
right.'" Id. Defendant further acknowledged that he had been on his cell phone to
Ms. Ruesch. Id. Asked to explain Defendant's purpose in calling Ms. Ruesch, the
4

officer asked again if he could refer to his report, but could not find a specific
reference within the report. Id. at 81-82. And when further questioned, Officer
Sorensen did not think that Defendant actually told him what the substance of his
conversation with Ms. Ruesch was. Id. at 82.
The prosecutor then asked Officer Sorensen what Defendant had said that
indicated to the officer that Defendant had been involved in a drug deal. Id. at 82.
Officer Sorensen asked, "Can I refer to my report and read that specifically?" Id. at
83. At that point, the trial court interjected, "Well, it depends on whether or not
there's an objection. Because he can utilize it for the purpose of refreshing his
memory." Id. Defense counsel then objected, asserting that he believed that the
officer had read the report, that it did not appear that he had an independent
memory of Defendant's specific statement of his involvement, and that to read the
report into the record would improperly allow the admission of hearsay. Id. The
court disagreed, stating that the officer had first to be asked if the report did refresh
his memory. Id. If it did, the court stated, the officer "could make reference to it."
Id. If it did not, the court stated, "he has no independent recollection as it relates to
[the specific statement] and the objection would be sustained." Id.
The prosecutor then asked Officer Sorensen, "Does that report refresh your
memory about what Mr. Lamoreaux said to you that night?" Id. Officer Sorensen
5

answered, "To be honest, no, it doesn't/7 Id, The prosecutor immediately asked,
"Okay. Did Mr. Lamoreaux say anything about why he changed his stories, from
initially denying any involvement and then admitting to you that he was involved?"
Id, Officer Sorensen answered, "Not that I recall." Id, At that point, the direct
examination of the officer ended. Id, at 84.
Testimony of Suzanne Ruesch
Ms. Ruesch testified on behalf of the State. R192:103,107. In connection with
the events on July 1,2008. She was charged with distribution of methamphetamine,
a first degree felony, and with possession of methamphetamine and paraphernalia.
Id, at 105-06. She pleaded guilty to distribution, reduced to a second degree felony
and she admitted that she pled because she was indeed guilty. Id, at 105-07.
Ms. Ruesch had "h[u]ng out" with Defendant ten years earlier, but she had
not seen him for some time. Id. at 104. The day before July 1,2008, Defendant called
her and requested that she "pick up some dope" — specifically, methamphetamine.
Id, at 107-108. The next day, as Ms. Ruesch drove with her friend, Amber Courts,
Defendant called Ms. Ruesch at least three times. Id. at 108-110,112-13. Following
Defendant's instructions, Ms. Ruesch picked up a quantity of methamphetamine in
Sandy, Utah, and, using scales to weigh out specific amounts of the drug, made
deliveries at the Best Motel in Utah County. Id, at 110-12. Ms. Ruesch then drove to
6

her daughter's house, where she was greeted by her daughter with her eight-monthold grandson, and, according to plan, she was to meet up with Defendant. Id. at
112-14. As Ms. Ruesch was about to leave, Defendant appeared. Id. at 112.
Defendant was accompanied by her grandson's father. Id. at 118. Defendant
was talking on his phone as he approached the driver's side of Ms. Ruesch's car. Id.
at 112. He asked Ms. Ruesch if she had "a teener" — a small quantity of drugs — but
because Defendant was "acting really weird," she told him that she did not have
any drugs. Id. at 114. Defendant nevertheless handed Ms. Ruesch his phone to
speak with a prospective buyer, but she immediately returned it to him when the
caller hung up. Id. 114-17. An instant later, Defendant threw his phone and his
black bag into the car as Ms. Ruesch heard the words, "Freeze, put your hands in
the air." Id. at 117.
Trial court's refusal to strike the officer's testimony
At the conclusion of Ms. Ruesch's testimony, Defendant moved for a directed
verdict. R192:133. In support of the motion, Defendant moved to strike "any
testimony from the officer relative to [his] confession" because the officer "had no
recollection of what was said," "reading the police report did not refresh his
memory, and he was not able to provide any testimony . . . independent from the

7

police report as to what he independently recollected was said by my client/7 Id.
Therefore, Defendant argued, the report was inadmissible hearsay. Id.
The trial court denied the motion to strike. Id. at 134. The court agreed with
the prosecutor, who stated that " Officer Sorensen stated very directly that his
memory was that [Defendant] admitted being involved in the arranging and
distribution of [methamphetamine]." Id. at 133,136-37. The court further expanded
that "[the officer] could not state with any specificity the exact language that was
stated by [Defendant], even upon referral to his police report."

Id. at 137.

Thereafter, the court denied the motion for directed verdict. Id. at 140.
Before closing argument, Defendant again returned to Officer Sorensen's
testimony, asserting that, because he referred to his report while testifying, Officer
Sorensen's testimony did not reflect an independent recollection that Defendant had
admitted his involvement in arranging to distribute methamphetamine. R193:8-9.
According to Defendant, the jury therefore should not be allowed to consider that
part of Officer Sorensen's testimony. Id.
The prosecutor disagreed: "I believe [the officer's] testimony was that he did
have an independent recollection of the Defendant incriminating himself, but he
was not able to recall with that independent recollection specific details about the
language the Defendant used. Id. The trial court stated, "That's my understanding.
8

..." Id. The prosecutor further argued that, at the moment Defendant was referring
to, Officer Sorensen was not reading from his report, and that review of the police
report would show "there is no statement in the report that [Defendant] admitted to
being involved in arranging to distribute methamphetamine." Id. at 9.
The trial court again refused to exclude the officer's challenged testimony,
ruling that Defendant might comment on his impressions of how the officer
testified, but that "I do have an independent recollection of how he testified
yesterday. And I think it just goes to the weight/' Id. at 9.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in overruling his hearsay objection
to Officer Sorensen's testimony that Defendant admitted involvement in the crime
for which he was convicted. In asserting his claim, however, Defendant entirely
disregards the trial court's finding that the officer testified on that issue from his
independent recollection. Moreover, Defendant fails to marshal all the record
evidence supporting the trial court's finding. Thus, Defendant's claim fails
Any error in admitting the officer's testimony was harmless. The officer
testified, without objection, as to Defendant's suspicious conduct and to his female
accomplice's admission that Defendant placed methamphetamine in her car. A
consensual search of the car uncovered methamphetamine and paraphernalia. The
9

accomplice pleaded guilty to distribution, forthrightly admitted her guilt, and
provided

details of Defendant's

direction to pick up

and

distribute

methamphetamine. Thus, additional substantial evidence supported Defendant's
guilt for distribution or arranging to distribute methamphetamine.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING THE
OFFICER'S TESTIMONY WHERE THE RECORD SHOWS THE
OFFICER TESTIFIED FROM HIS INDEPENDENT
RECOLLECTION OF DEFENDANT'S ADMISSION TO
ARRANGING TO DISTRIBUTE METHAMPHETAMINE
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in not "eMine! an instruction to
the jury stating that Officer Sorensen's testimony that the Defendant had confessed
should not have been considered/'

Aplt. Br. at 5.

He argues that

Officer Sorensen's testimony was inadmissible hearsay as it was apparent from the
witness's own statement that he was transmitting to the jury the contents of his
report and not the contents of his memory [—i.e., his independent recollection]/'
Aplt. Br. at 5

10

A. Defendant's claim disregards the trial court's findings and is
unsupported by the record.
"Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by these rules/'
UTAH R. EVID. 802.! Rule 612, Utah Rules of Evidence, however, provides for the
refreshing of recollection without regard for the admissibility of the memory
refreshing object. See 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGERET A. BERGER WEINSTEIN'S

EVIDENCE f 612:14-15 (1994) ("Anything may be used to revive memory.... The aid
to memory need not be admissible in evidence/') Thus, even hearsay may be used
to aid a witness's memory if it refreshes his independent recollection of the matter
under inquiry.
Defendant seizes on a corollary to this last rule: "[B]ut where a document is
excluded from admission because hearsay, the contents thereof cannot be got in
evidence under the pretext of refreshing a recollection/' S.W. Bridges & Co. v.
Candland, 88 Utah 373, 54 P.2d 842, 847 (1936). And "[refreshing a recollection is
not equivalent to reading from a document." Id. He argues that the trial court
"exercised no care to see that the report was being used for the limited function of
starting the recollective process, exemplified by the officer's reference to the report

1

"'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted." UTAH R. EVID. 801(c).
11

"throughout the entirety of his testimony" without oversight by the court. Aplt. Br.
at 7. In so argumg, Defendant assumes that the officer simply read from his report
and that the trial court simply acquiesced in that impropriety.

Defendant's

argument, however, completely disregards the trial court's findings and the
supporting record.
"A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that
supports the challenged finding." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); State v. Chavez-Espinoza,
2008 UT App 191, f 7,186 P.3d 1023 ("[I]n order to challenge a trial court's factual
findings, a party must marshal all the evidence in favor of the very findings they
oppose on appeal."), cert, denied, 199 P.3d 367 (Utah 2008). This means that the party
must "marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that
despite this evidence, the [trial] court's findings are so lacking in support as to be
against the clear weight of the evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous." In re
A.B., 2007 UT App 286, If 13, 168 P.3d 820. "Where a party fails to meet the
marshaling requirement, [this Court] generally will assume that the evidence on
record adequately supports the trial court's findings." Id. at ^f 20 (citation omitted).
In this case, Defendant does not mention the trial court's findings, marshal
any evidence in support of those findings related to Officer Sorensen's testimony,
marshal any evidence in support of those findings or make any effort to show that
12

those findings are clearly erroneous. Defendant, therefore, has failed to meet his
marshaling requirement, and this Court should decline to consider Defendant's
claim. In any case, the claim is without merit.
In denying Defendant's motion to strike Officer Sorensen's testimony, the trial
court made the following findings:
My recollection as it relates to the admission is as follows. [The
officer] had no recollection of the exact wording that [Defendant] said
in connection with it, but he had made - - the officer had made some
statement as it relates to his involvement. And his testimony was that
[Defendant] finally said "Right" or "Correct." There was an admission as
it relates to tlie statement oftlie officer relative to [Defendant's involvement
with tlie drugs. [Emphasis added.]
r\
Rl92:134. The court expanded that" [the officer] could not state with any specificity
the exact language that was stated by [Defendant], even upon referral to his police
report." Id. at 137. Before closing argument, when Defendant again sought to keep
the officer's statement from the jury, the court reiterated its finding by again
adopting the prosecutor's view. Id. at 193:8. The prosecutor stated, "I believe [the
officer's] testimony was that he did have an independent recollection of the
Defendant incriminating himself, but he was not able to recall with that

1

r-w-rf

The entire record surrounding the officer's challenged testimony is attached
at Addendum B. The record of the trial court's findings is attached at Addendum C.
13

independent recollection specific details about the language the Defendant used. Id.
The trial court stated, "That's my understanding

" Id.

The record, which Defendant fails to marshal, supports the trial court's
findings. Officer Sorensen testified that "[Defendant] did make some incriminating
statements" during the officer's exchange with Defendant at the police station,
without reference to his police report Id. at 79-80. Only when then asked to
describe what Defendant said did the officer ask to refer to his report. Id. at 80. In
response, the prosecutor cautioned the officer, "You can refer to it to refresh your
memory, but please don't read from it." Id. at 81. After referring to the report,
Officer Sorensen reaffirmed Defendant's admission of his involvement in
distribution of methamphetamine, although the officer acknowledged that
Defendant "probably did not use those specific words." Id. When then asked how
Defendant indicated he had been involved, Officer Sorensen stated, without
reference to the report, "He - eventually said, 'Yeah, you know, I - you're right.'"
Id. When further queried about what precisely Defendant had said, the officer
repeatedly and forthrightly admitted that he could not recall the specifics of
Defendant's admission, even when he referred to the report: "To — to be honest, to
the best of my recollection, I -1 can't recall his specific words, exactly what he said."
Id. at 81-83. Finally, when the prosecutor argued that Officer Sorensen was not
14

reading from his report, he asserted that review of the police report would show
"there is no statement in the report that [Defendant] admitted to being involved in
arranging to distribute methamphetamine./, R193:9. Defendant neither objected to
this assertion nor did he move for a new trial to show that his admission did appear
in the report. And on appeal, Defendant makes no attempt to rebut the prosecutor's
argument that the officer could not have been reading the crucial admission because
it did not appear in the report.
Thus, the trial court's findings and the record show that Officer Sorensen,
after reviewing his report, had an independent recollection that Defendant had
made an incriminating admission of his involvement in drug distribution. Stated
differently, the findings and the record support that Officer Sorensen's testimony
was not the result of his having read the admission from the report, but that report
refreshed his memory as to Defendant's admission of guilt generally, even while it
failed to refresh his memory as to Defendant's specific words. Thus, the trial court
did not err in rejecting Defendant's hearsay objection to Officer Sorensen's
testimony.
Finally, the record rebuts Defendant's contention that the trial court
"exercised no care to see that the report was being used for the limited function of
starting the recollective process. Aplt. Br. at 7. At the point Officer Sorensen gave
15

his crucial testimony that Defendant admitted he was involved in arranging to
distribute methamphetamine, the prosecutor cautioned the officer not to read from
his report. R192.79-81. As discussed, the trial court later found and record supports
that the officer was not then reading from his report and that, when asked, he
candidly testified that the report did not refresh his recollection as to Defendant's
specific words. Id. at 79-81. When the prosecutor then pressed Officer Sorensen
further as to what Defendant had actually said, the officer asked, "Can I refer to my
report and read that specifically?" Id. at 82-83. At that point, the trial court
interjected, "Well, it depends on whether or not there's an objection. Because he can
utilize it for the purpose of refreshing his memory." Id. at 83. Defendant objected
on the ground that the officer had read the report into the record and that his
testimony was therefore hearsay. Id. The court disagreed, stating that the officer
had first to be asked if the report did refresh his memory. Id. If it did, the court
stated, the officer "could make reference to it." Id. If it did not, the court stated, "he
has no independent recollection as it relates to [Defendant's specific statement] and
the objection would be sustained." Id. The prosecutor then asked Officer Sorensen,
"Does that report refresh your memory about what Mr. Lamoreaux said to you that
night?" Id. Officer Sorensen answered, "To be honest, no, it doesn't." Id. This
recounting of the proceedings shows that the court carefully tracked the way Officer
16

Sorensen's testimony came in and deliberately directed a procedure that ensured
that his testimony would not constitute inadmissible hearsay.
In sum, Defendant fails to show that the trial court erred in allowing into
evidence inadmissible hearsay of his admission to being involved in arranging to
distribute methamphetamine. Moreover, even if error occurred, the error was
harmless.
B. Any error in admitting the officer's testimony was harmless in
light of the additional substantial evidence of Defendant's guilt.
"[H] armless error is an error that is sufficiently inconsequential that there is
no reasonable likelihood that it affected the outcome of the proceedings. Put
differently, an error is harmful only if the likelihood of a different outcome is
sufficiently high that it undermines our confidence in the verdict." State v. Evans,
2001UT 22,1 20,20 P.3d 888 (citation omitted); see also UTAH R. CRIM. P. 30(a) ("Any
error, defect, irregularity [,] or variance which does not affect the substantial rights of
a party shall be disregarded/7)
Even if the trial court erred in admitting Officer Sorensen's testimony of his
incriminating admission, there was other substantial evidence to support
Defendant's

conviction

of

distribution

of

or

arranging

to

distribute

methamphetamine. Officer Sorensen testified, without objection, that when he

17

approached Ms. Ruesch's car he saw hand Ms. Ruesch something. R192:67. Ms.
Ruesch admitted that there was methamphetamine in the car, placed there by
Defendant. Id. at 69-70. A consensual search of the car revealed a black bag
containing paraphernalia and a large amount of methamphetamine. Id. at 69-72,76.
Ms. Ruesch, who pleaded guilty to distribution of methamphetamine and freely
acknowledged her guilt, testified that Defendant repeatedly called her and to
arrange for her to pick specific quantities of methamphetamine, which she then
distributed. Id. at 105-10,112-13. This evidence was more than ample to support
Defendant's conviction. Thus, even if the trial court erred in admitting Officer
Sorensen's challenged testimony, the error was harmless.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm Defendant's conviction.
Respectfully submitted April 2L, 2010.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF

Utah Ajtteyney General

A. B&dNstoN
Assistant Attorney General

KENNETH
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Addendum A

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE,

Rule 612. Writing used to refresh memory

If a witness uses a writing to refresh the witness' memory for the purpose of testifying,
either
(1) while testifying, or
(2) before testifying, if the court in its discretion determines it is necessary in the interests
of justice,
an adverse party is entitled to have the writing produced at the hearing, to inspect it, to
cross-examine the witness thereon, and to introduce in evidence those portions which
relate to the testimony of the witness. If it is claimed that the writing contains matters not
related to the subject matter of the testimony the court shall examine the writing in
camera, excise any portions not so related, and order delivery of the remainder to the
party entitled thereto. Any portion withheld over objections shall be preserved and made
available to the appellate court in the event of an appeal. If a writing is not produced or
delivered pursuant to order under this rule, the court shall make any order justice
requires, except that in criminal cases when the prosecution elects not to comply, the
order shall be one striking the testimony or, if the court in its discretion determines that
the interests of justice so require, declaring a mistrial.
[Amended effective October 1, 1992.]
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE,

Rule 801. Hearsay - Definitions

The following definitions apply under this article:
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct
of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion.
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement.
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if:
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject
to cross-examination concerning the statement and the statement is (A) inconsistent with
the declarant's testimony or the witness denies having made the statement or has
forgotten, or (B) consistent with the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an
express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper
influence or motive, or (C) one of identification of a person made after perceiving the
person; or

(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against a party and is (A) the
party's own statement, in either an individual or a representative capacity, or (B) a
statement of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a
statement by a person authorized by the party to make a statement concerning the subject,
or (D) a statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of
the agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a
statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the
conspiracy.
[Amended effective October 1, 1992.]

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, Rule 802.

Hearsay rule

Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by these rules.
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 30. Errors and Defects
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the substantial rights
of a party shall be disregarded.
(b) Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors in the
record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time and
after such notice, if any, as the court may order.
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County Jail?
A

They were all taken to the Utah County Jail.

Q

And did you speak with them again at the jail?

A

I did.

Q

Okay.

I spoke with all three.
Let's talk about your discussion with

Mr. Lamoreaux while you were at the jail.

Where were you when

you had that discussion?
A

I was at the booking desk, which is if you go into

the jail, you go into the sally port, you go in the front door,
there's several computers there where -- that we use in order
to put the information in on each individual that's brought
into the jail.
time.

He was actually sitting right next to me at the

I was at the computer.

He wasn't more than three,

four -- three feet at the most from where I was next to the
computer.
Q

Okay.

And what did you say to him?

A

At that point I was talking to him just like a friend

or friends would talk to each other, having a conversation
about the situation and circumstances.

I tried to tell him

based on the information that I had gained from the people that
he was involved with, that he was in a lot of trouble, and, you
know, it was basically -- it was better for him to be honest
and let me know what was going on. And he initially denied,
again, that he was involved in any kind of distribution issue
at the scene, but eventually he did make some incriminating
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT

statements.
Q

Now, let me ask you real quick.

Did you take any

written statements from any of the people while you were at the
scene?
A

I did.

Q

And who was that from?

A

Ms. Ruesch specifically.

Q

Did you inform Mr. Lamoreaux that you had a written

statement?
A

I did.

He was actually right there when she was

actually writing it out.
Q

Okay.

So when you were discussing this with him at

the jail, he knew there was this statement?
A

Yeah, he saw her writing it out.

Q

Okay.

You mentioned after you advised him that it

might be better for him to be honest and cooperate that he made
some admissions.
A

I will.

Will you describe what he said?
Initially, he would --he kept asking me,

Why am I here, why am I here?

I -- I didn't do anything.

You

know, I wasn't involved in any of this.
And then I would -- I told him, Tim, you know, I've
got all this information.

You know, just come clean and tell

me -- tell me what's going on, you know.
And at that point, according to my report, I
indicated here -- if I can refer to that?
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT
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Q

You can refer to it to refresh your memory, but

please don't read from it.
A

Okay.

He did admit that he was involved in making

the arrangements to distribute methamphetamine.
Q

And did he use those words?

A

He probably did not use those specific words.

Q

Do you recall roughly what he said?

A

To -- to be honest, to the best of my recollection,

I -- I can't recall his specific words, exactly what he said.
Q

How did he indicate to you that he had been involved?

A

He -- he eventually said, Yeah, you know, I -- you're

right.
Q

Okay.

And did he say anything else?

A

You know, to be honest, I can't remember exactly what

he said after that.
Q

Okay.

So did he say anything about making phone

calls to Suzanne Ruesch?
A

Yes.

Q

What did he state?

A

He indicated to me initially that he was on his cell

phone and that he had contacted Suzanne Ruesch.
Q

Did he state what the purpose of contacting her was?

A

To be honest, and it's not in my -- as far as I can

see in my report.
Q

If I can refer to it real quick?

That's fine.
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT

A

I don't see that I included in my report exactly what

he mentioned in the phone call - - o r conversation.
Q

Okay.

That's fine.

Did he say anything about what you saw when you
walked up?

You said you saw him handing something to somebody.

Did he say anything about that?
A

He did.

He indicated that it wasn't what I thought

it was, that he was actually only handing her a cell phone.
Q

Did he say why he was handing her a cell phone?
Or let me back up.

Did he say whose cell phone it

was?
A

I can't remember if he -- if he said that it was

actually his cell phone or whose cell phone it was.

But he had

it in his possession, and I -- I do believe that it was his
cell phone.
Q

Okay.

And did he say anything about what the

conversation was about that he was having on the phone as he
handed it to Ms. Ruesch?
A

If I remember right, I don't know that he actually

told me what the conversation was initially that - - a s far as
the cell phone.
Q

Okay.

What about what he said indicated to you that

he had been involved with this drug deal?
A

Let me refer to my report one more time, please.

Q

That's fine.
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT
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A

Can I refer to my report and read that specifically?
THE COURT:

Well, it depends on whether or not

there's an objection.

Because he can utilize it for the

purpose of refreshing his memory.
MR. KING:

Your Honor, I think the witness has

testified that he doesn't have a memory of what was actually
said.

If he read from the report, he would simply be reading

from the report, which would be hearsay.
He's read the report.
remember what was said.

He's testified that he can't

I would say that it's been shown that

the report is not able to refresh his memory.

Therefore, it

would be inadmissible.
THE COURT:

I don't know.

The next question is

whether or not reading the report -- whether it does, in fact,
refresh his memory.
it.

If it does, then he can make reference to

If it doesn't, then he has no independent recollection as

it relates to it and the objection would be sustained.
MR. PERKINS:

Okay.

MR. PERKINS:

Q.

Does that report refresh your

memory about what Mr. Lamoreaux said to you that night?
A

To be honest, no, it doesn't.

Q

Okay.

Did Mr. Lamoreaux say anything about why he

changed his stories, from initially denying any involvement and
then admitting to you that he was involved?
A

Not that I recall.
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT

Q

Okay.

When -- I'll reserve that question for a later

point.
MR. PERKINS:

At this point I have no further

questions.
THE COURT:

You may cross-examine.

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. KING:
Q

Officer Sorensen, you say you interviewed

Mr. Lamoreaux twice in the investigation of this; is that
correct?
A

I believe that's how many times I interviewed him.

Q

Okay.

When you interviewed him at the scene, you

testified that you asked him what was going on; is that
correct?
A

Yes, sir.

Q

You testified that he played innocent.

But do you

recall at this point if he told you a story as to what was
going on in response to your question?
A

If he told me a story, I don't remember what that

story would have been.
MR. KING:
THE COURT:

I have no further questions.
Very well.

You may step down.

Thank you very much.

Next witness, please?
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT
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MR. KING:

Your Honor, I would move -- relative to

the motion for a directed verdict, I'd also make a motion to
strike from the record any testimony from the officer relative
to Mr. Lamoreaux's confession.

As he testified himself on the

stand not only that he had no recollection of what was said,
but also that reading the police report did not refresh his
memory and he was not able to provide any testimony today
independent from the police report as to what he independently
recollected was said by my client.
On that grounds, anything in the police report would
be hearsay and cannot be relied upon by this Court.

And

without anybody here to testify as to an independent
recollection of that, I don't believe there's any grounds to
admit any evidence relative to that confession.
THE COURT:

Okay.

First of all, let's address that.
Respond, please.
MR. PERKINS:

Your Honor, I believe the record will

reflect that Officer Sorensen testified categorically that he
remembered Mr. Lamoreaux admitting to being involved in the
arrangement of the distribution of methamphetamine.

When I

further asked for details on that, he was unable to recall
speciEics.

This was, however, six months ago, and police

reports are often used to refresh memories about details.
Officer Sorensen testified that he was unable to independently
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT

recollect the details of what Mr. Lamoreaux said, but he was
very clear and unequivocal about his knowledge to remember that
Mr. Lamoreaux did admit involvement.
THE COURT:

Okay.

I will deny the motion.

An officer's report can be

utilized for the purpose of refreshing memory.

It is accurate

that as to a number of details Officer Sorensen looked at his
report and it did not refresh his memory.

But he indicated

those areas on the record which areas he had no independent
recollection of and which he did.
My recollection as it relates to the admission is as
follows.

He had no recollection of the exact wording that he

said in connection with it, but he had made -- the officer had
made some statement as it relates to his involvement.

And his

testimony was that Mr. Lamoreaux finally said "Right" or
"Correct."

There was an admission as it relates to the

statement of the officer relative to Mr. Lamoreaux?s
involvement with the drugs.
As to the specifics beyond that, counsel, you are
accurate that he was not able to refresh his memory from
referral to the police report itself.

But those areas were

patently clear on the record and before the jury, so.
MR. KING:

So, if I may, Your Honor?

For purposes of

that testimony, are you finding that -- I guess what statements
are you finding -CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT
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THE COURT:
MR. KING:

Well, you can either --- that he did say he --

THE COURT:

You can either make a record as it

relates to the specificity.

But if you're doing it generically

in sort of a broad brush, then it's a denial relative to that.
I think the record is absolutely clear that Officer Sorensen
indicated on the record when and when not -- when the report
refreshed his memory and when it did not.
MR. KING:

Very well, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

And when it did and when he had an

independent recollection, it may remain.

That's my

recollection.
MR. KING:

May I request from the Court if I may be

able to obtain a copy of either the transcript or recording of
that portion of the officer's testimony prior to closing so
that I can appropriately go over what he remembered and did not
remember.

My notes -THE COURT:

notes.

You're going to have to rely on your

The court reporter's not going to be able to provide

you with a transcript of this trial prior to closing, I don't
believe.
MR. KING:
THE COURT:

Okay.
At the very least it would be a rough

draft.
MR. KING:

Yeah.

My notes indicated that he said

CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT

that he -- he could specifically state that he knew that
Mr. Lamoreaux made some incriminating statements.

But other

than that, I haven't marked down that everything that - - h e
couldn't recall an independent recollection as to anything
specific beyond that incriminating statements were made.

I

don't know if my notes or my understanding of what took place
was inaccurate, but that's what I recall and that's what my
notes indicate.
I guess my further question would be if the Court's
memory is different, if counsel's memory is different, what am
I allowed to argue in closing if my notes indicate -THE COURT:

You are able to argue from that position.

I think your -- your position is accurate.

He indicated my

recollection of his testimony is that he claimed that your
client made some incriminating statements.

He could not

testify as to the exact language of those incriminating
statements, except for the fact that he said, quote, unquote,
"Right" or "Correct."
Now -MR. PERKINS:
THE COURT:

Just for --- perhaps my recollection is inaccurate.

I don't know.
MR. PERKINS:

Just for the record, my recollection

also includes that Officer Sorensen stated very directly that
his memory was that Mr. Lamoreaux admitted being involved in
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT
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the arranging and distribution of that.
THE COURT:

That was my recollection, though he

doesn't -- that he could not state with any specificity the
exact language that was stated by Mr. Lamoreaux, even upon
referral to his police report.
But, counsel, yes, you can obtain a rough draft, it
won't be a certified copy, of the testimony of Officer
Sorensen, and utilize that in connection with your closing,
certainly.
MR. KING:

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT:
a certified copy.

But it will be a rough draft, it won't be

Okay?

MR. KING:

Understood.

Relative to that, I would continue with my motion for
a directed verdict, based on the fact that the testimony
basically as to this incriminating testimony towards my client
consists solely of the -- that incriminating statements were
made without specificity as to what those were.
And then Ms. Ruesch's testimony which I'm looking to
show that the many areas where her testimony was inconsistent
on the stand even with her own testimony.

I can specifically

point to the fact that she testified that she received a black
bag from when she went to the Best Motel, and then testified
that my client had thrown it into the vehicle.

She testified

that these statements were accurate, therefore, testifying that
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT

she intended to give all the drugs to other people independent
of my client.
Also this statement she testified that it was
accurate when she stated that he handed her the cell phone to
talk with Rachel and Tim when the officer approached.

But then

contrary to that same testimony by stating that he had thrown
the phone in or thrown the phone and the baggy in while they
were speaking.
I'd also point out that her testimony that my client
gave her the phone and then was intending to leave, she called
him back and gave him the phone.

The officer's approach is

wholly inconsistent with the testimony we received from the
officer who testified that he saw my client handing her
something when he approached, which is also inconsistent with
any of her statements that my client threw something into the
car at that time.
Based on the fact that we have three statements that
she gave prior to today where there are inconsistencies and her
own -- her testimony today is concurrent with none of those
statements and it's inconsistent with itself, I would ask this
Court to find that her testimony is not testimony that a
reasonable jury would be able to use in finding my client
guilty.
And with that, I'd submit it.
THE COURT:

Okay.

CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT
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You may be heard, Mr. Perkins.
MR. PERKINS:

Your Honor, to survive the motion for a

directed verdict, the State only needs to make a prima facie
case.

And it ! s my contention that we've done that.

We've

heard Officer Sorensen testify that he arrested individuals,
found methamphetamine, and took confessions from two of those
people; Ms. Ruesch and Mr. Lamoreaux.
Again, although Mr. -- or, excuse me, although
Officer Sorensen's recollection was lacking in detail, it was
clear in the sense that Mr. Lamoreaux had incriminated himself
in the charges against him.
Ms. Ruesch's testimony.

The State actually expected

it to be much more inconsistent than it turned out to be.

Most

of these inconsistencies actually turn out to be minor details
that lawyers like to pick out and look at and hang their case
on, myself included.

I'm not disparaging Mr. King at all.

I

was intending to try to survive some of her inconsistencies
with some of these minor details.

But in the end I believe

Ms. Ruesch is testifying about something that happened six
months ago that was very emotional, probably very stressful for
her as well.

It's unlikely that she will recall the details as

we like to parse them out looking at reports and going over a
case months later.
What I'm getting at is I don't think her testimony
was so inconsistent that it's unbelievable.
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT

She corroborates

pretty much everything that Officer Sorensen testified to, and
she also has implicated the defendant at least beyond the level
of a prima facie case.
THE COURT: Well, I'll deny the motion for a directed
verdict.

The State has established a prima facie case,

acknowledging that there are inconsistencies in testimony.
goes to an issue of credibility.
the jury.

It

Issues of credibility go to

And if there are internal inconsistencies in terms

of her testimony today and external inconsistencies as it
relates to prior statements, Mr. King can underscore those and
highlight those before the jury at closing for as long as he
wishes.

So very well.
Now, with that, denying the motion for a directed

verdict, finding a prima facie case, and allowing issues of
inconsistencies and testimony and issues of credibility to go
to the jury, then where do we stand as it relates to the
defense at this point in time?
MR. KING:

The State has rested.

I think if I might have a few moments to

discuss that with my client -THE COURT: Very well.
MR. KING:

-- especially relative to whether or not

he will take the stand.
THE COURT: We will take a short break, give you that
opportunity to see whether you anticipate calling him or any
witnesses or whether you would rest at this time.
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT

Thank you.
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iinn is'"

zone.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. PERKINS:
THE COURT:

And I --

Then we'll leave that language there and

we will simply modify and strike paragraphs 1 through 9 in the
description of what a drug free zone is.

Okay.

Well, I think with that modification we are ready,
then, to make copies.
Anything further, counsel?
MR. KING:
clarify.

Your Honor, I wanted to -- if I might

Based on my motion and our discussion of Officer

Sorensen's testimony, testimony relative to his independent
recollection versus the hearsay from the report.

On reviewing

his testimony, he stated -- basically, as I had said prior,
that he said in that interview he made some incriminating
statements, and then he was asked what those statements were.
His next reply was, According to the report, he admitted that
he was involved in arranging to distribute.
Then when asked specifically what he said that
indicated that he had been involved in that, the only thing
that he could independently recollect was a comment of "You're
right.»
I would just ask that either the jury be instructed
relative to that, or that at least we be instructed in our
closing to only make reference to the two comments that he made
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT

incriminating statements, and that the statement was "You're
right."
THE COURT:

Well, I think you can comment -- you have

leave, of course, to comment as it relates to the testimony.
Whatever the testimony is is what you're restricted to.

So

however that plays out is how you're going to argue.
MR. KING:

My concern is that if the jury is left

with the impression that his statement that the report said
that he admitted to being involved in arranging to distribute,
that they would take that as evidence.

Where, in fact, I think

the rules imply that that could not be evidence unless it was
verified by an independent recollection which he could not do.
THE COURT:

You can respond to that, counsel.

MR. PERKINS:

No, I would disagree with that.

I

believe his testimony was that he did have an independent
recollection of the defendant incriminating himself but he was
not able to recall with that independent recollection specific
details about the language the defendant used.
THE COURT:

That's my understanding, and I think

that's how you argue it to the jury on both sides.
I mean, you have the transcript, correct?
MR. KING:

I don't have the transcript, but I did

review the audio -THE COURT:
MR. KING:

Oh, okay.
-- recording.
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THE COURT:
MR. KING:

So what is your request to the Court?
My specific request is that his statement

where he said, According to the report he made, he admitted
being involved in arranging to distribute, that that statement
not be allowed -- that there be an instruction from the Court
to the jury that that statement should not be considered as
evidence in this case.
Whereas the rest of his testimony relative to his
independent recollection, I think, would be admissible.

But

that specific statement where he said, According to the report,
and basically he then read a sentence from the report which
report we have established would be hearsay, whereas it has not
been supported by an independent recollection.
MR. PERKINS:

When he made that statement, my -- he

was not reading from the report.

In fact, if we reviewed the

police report now, there is no statement in the report that he
admitted to being involved in arranging to distribute
methamphetamine.

There are other statements specific --

THE COURT:

I'm going to simply allow you to comment

as it relates to your impressions of how he testified.

I don't

have a transcript before me, I haven't heard the audio, but I
do have an independent recollection of how he testified
yesterday.

And I think it just goes to the weight.

how I will rule.
MR. KING:

Thank you, Your Honor.
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And that's

